Minimum capital requirements, bank supervision and special resolution schemes. Consequences for bank risk-taking

Minimum capital requirements, bank supervision and special resolution schemes. Consequences for bank risk-taking

This paper analyzes the incentive effects of special bank resolution schemes which were introduced during the recent financial crisis. These schemes allow regulators to take control over a systemically important financial institution before bankruptcy. We ask how special resolution schemes influence banks’ risk-taking and whether regulators should combine them with minimum capital requirements. We model a single bank which is supervised by a regulator who receives an imperfect signal about the bank’s probability of success. We find that capital requirements are better than resolution from a welfare point of view if the quality of the signal is low, if it is difficult for the bank to attract deposits, or if the project return is low.

Uwe Vollmer and Harald Wiese

Journal of Financial Stability

December 2013

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