This Week in Financial Regulation, August 18th

This Week in Financial Regulation, August 18th

News & Commentary

In an article in the New York Times, Jeanna Smialek and Alan Rappeport discuss how, as Secretary of the Treasury, Janet Yellen will have influential input during the process to reappoint or replace Powell as Chairman of the Fed.

In a piece in VoxEU, Luke Bartholomew and Paul Diggle make the case for violation of central bank independence in order to fight climate change.

In a piece in Pro Market, Mahsa Kaviani, Hosein Maleki, and Pavel Savor discuss their new paper on examining whether banks use loans to establish political connections. They find that “firms linked to members of Congress receive lower interest rates on new loans, which are also larger and have fewer covenants.”

In a report to Congressional Addressees, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) examines the Economic Injury Disaster Loan program. Based on its findings, the GAO recommends that the Small Business Administration “develop a comprehensive communications strategy that includes guidelines for the type and timing of information to be provided to potential and actual applicants of its disaster response programs.”

In a piece at Forbes, Ted Knutson discusses Senate Banking Committee Chair Sherrod Brown’s claims that the US financial system has not delivered for most Americans.

In an article in the New York Times, Emily Flitter discusses Saule Omarova, a candidate for comptroller of the currency being vetted by the Biden Administration, and her work on risks related to cryptocurrency and fintechs.


New Research

In a paper at NBER, Amir Sufi and Alan M. Taylor survey the literature on financial crises.

In a working paper at the European Central Bank (ECB), Cecilia Melo Fernandes examines how ECB communication works as a device for stabilization and coordination.

In a paper at NBER, Annette Vissing-Jorgensen examines the treasury market in Spring 2020 and the response of the federal reserve. She finds that “Fed purchases were causal for reducing Treasury yields based on the timing of purchases (which increased on March 19), the timing of yield reversal and Fed purchases in the MBS market, and evidence against confounding factors.”

In a paper at NBER, Gabriel Chodorow-Reich, Adam M. Guren, and Timothy J. McQuade use present day hindsight to examine the housing cycle of the 2000s. They argue that the “evidence motivates [their] neo-Kindlebergerian model, in which an improvement in fundamentals triggers a boom-bust-rebound.”

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By |2021-08-18T14:13:39-07:00August 18th, 2021|Blog, Financial Regulation|