This paper attempts to set forth a framework for thinking about growth volatility which is general enough to incorporate the important structural, institutional, and policy variations among countries which might [...]
The 1934 Securities and Exchange Act and subsequent amendments required securities exchanges to operate as self-regulatory organizations (SROs) that police themselves under the supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission. [...]
This paper presents a model of competition in the banking industry based upon the interplay of two factors: the level of capitalization of banks and their ability to monitor different [...]
The on-going reform of the Basel Accord relies on three “pillars”: capital adequacy requirements, centralized supervision and market discipline. This article develops a simple continuous-time model of commercial banks’ behavior [...]
We document the build-up of regulatory and market equity capital in large U.S. bank holding companies between 1986 and 2000. During this time, large banking firms raised their capital ratios [...]
We assess the influence of competition and capital regulation on the stability of the banking system. We particularly ask two questions: i) how does capital regulation affect (endogenous) entry; and [...]
This paper develops a banking-sector framework with heterogeneous loan monitoring costs. Banks are exposed to the moral hazard behavior of borrowers and endogenously choose whether to monitor their loans to [...]
While the theoretical and empirical finance literature has focused almost exclusively on enterprise credit, about half of credit extended by banks to the private sector in a sample of 45 [...]
A fall in house prices due to a change in fundamental value redistributes wealth from those long housing (for whom the fundamental value of the house they own exceeds the [...]
We model the panic of 2008 as part of the wealth and substitution effects deriving from a housing price crash that began in 2006. The dissipation of the wealth effect [...]