On the theory of growth controls
[We show] in our model that the primary beneficiaries of growth controls are owners of developed land, e.g., homeowners, while the primary losers are owners of undeveloped land. Since the [...]
[We show] in our model that the primary beneficiaries of growth controls are owners of developed land, e.g., homeowners, while the primary losers are owners of undeveloped land. Since the [...]
This study proposes, and finds evidence supporting, the hypothesis that restrictive residential land-use and minimum lot-size zoning are substitute ways of controlling the population intensity of future residential development. In [...]
This paper estimates the demand for residential growth controls using voting results for the November 1988 election in San Diego County. An empirical model is estimated to determine the effect [...]
This paper provides an analysis of the supply-restriction model of growth controls. Growth controls in such a model harm consumers while enriching landowners, and they will only be adopted if [...]
Under urban planning in the United States, virtually every major development is subjected to the vagaries of the rezoning process and the uncertainties associated with legislative review by planning boards [...]
When competitive landowners/developers control incorporation and zoning decisions, efficient patterns of development emerge. When, by contrast, early arrivals control policy, they may impose zoning restrictions that force later entrants to [...]
What then is the appropriate role of government with respect to urban spatial structure, from the perspective of the monocentric model? If automobile travel cannot be priced efficiently then government [...]
By showing evidence of strategic interaction in the choice of growth controls, the paper suggests that important local policy decisions of this type are not taken in a vacuum. When [...]
An owner-occupied home is an unusual asset because it cannot be diversified among locations and because it is the only sizable asset that most owners possess. Among the uninsured risks [...]
Tiebout’s “vote with your feet” model dispensed with political behavior in local government. The present article offers a political model borrowed from corporate finance. Local governments are viewed as municipal [...]